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Asia's Next Tiger?
Vietnam is fraught with promise and peril for marketers.
V ietnam has come a long way sincethe 1986 decision by the Commu-nist Party (CPV) to implement DoiMoi, or economic renovation. Itseconomy is humming along with
near-double-digit growth rates and foreign
inve.stors line up to fund the choice projects for
Vietnam's expansion. Abroad, Vietnam has
achieved stable relations with its neighbors,
reduced its military expenditures, and forged for-
eign policy successes with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United
States, and China.
These macroeconomic and foreign policy
trends have spawned a boom economy. The Viet-
namese govemment wants—indeed, desperately
needs—this boom to continue, and Vietnamese
consumers are increasingly unlikely to accept any-
thing less than full integration inio the global
economy. As economic reforms create more
wealth in Vietnam, more and more Vietnamese
consumers are shifting from the grind of daily sub-
sistence to the joys of consumption.
If Vietnam continue.s its drive to modernize,
promising opportunities ior marketing firms will
continue to emerge. But peril accompanies this
promi.se and marketing managers must have a
keen awareness of the many factors that can pre-
dict success or failure in Vietnam.
War Wounds
Say the word "Vietnam" and myriad images
come to mind. For most Americans, it evokes recol
lections of grisly war footage and boat people; for
younger Americans, it conjures up Hollywood's
depictions of the war. Rarely does one think of pre-
sent-day Vietnam, a country of enormous natural
wealth and limitless potential. Its natural assets
include timber, fisheries, vast oil and gas reserves, a
coastline longer than the one extending between
Seattle and San Diego, and fertile soil that has
enabled Vietnam to become the third-laigest rice
producer in the world. The nation's cultural wealth
includes the traditions and historical sites of 4.000
years of national identity. Its people are industrious,
cheerful, and very keen to join the consumer soci-
ety. Yet Vietnam still struggles to be seen as a
country, not a war.
Recently, Vietnam has been able to attract sig-
nificant private investment capital and multilateral
aid; the Ministry of Planning and Investment
received license applications for $5.4 hillion in
EXECUTIVE
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V ietnam has evolved from one of the worstperforming economies in Asia tlttrinii the early
1980s, lo winning the Euromoney Best Matiaged
Economy Award in the '90s. Foreign investors, betting
that Vietnam was seriotis abottt its economic reforms,
rushed to penetrate this market. Some succeeded,
many failed. Vietnam must now respond to the
challenge of rising expectations by foreign investors
while delivering increased variety and qttaltty of
goods demanded by its people. The transition from a
command to a market economy continues to lurch
forward, creating a promising but perilous marketing
environment.
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1995 and hopes to exceed $6
billion in 1996. With devel-
opment aid came more pri-
vate business. The World
Bank financed a $2 billion
highway and infrastructure
project that brought hig
American companies such as
Caterpillar. Morrison Knud-
sen. and others to Vietnam.
Total investment of over
$520 miUion from U.S. com-
panies alone flowed into
Vietnam by the end of 1995.
Forward-thinking market-
ing managers took at Viet-
nam as a promising market;
with 74 million consumers, it
is the 13th largest in the
world. Whether one is selling
earth movers or soft drinks,
airplanes or cosmetics. Viet-
nam is already a burgeoning
market with considerable
purchasing power. In 1994.,
the United States was a virtu-
al nonplayer; by 1996, it was
the sixth-largest investor.
Nevertheless, Vietnam is not
an "easy" market, nor is it
one that lends itself to simple
replications of successful strategies used in other
parts of Southeast Asia or China. Vietnam is a
market of inexplicable contradictions of the good-
news, bad-news sort.
First, the Bad News
With all the hype over opportunity in Vietnam.
it's easy to forget that this economic change is quite
recent. Once isolated and totally dependent on dwin-
dling aid from the Soviet-controlled Council for
Mutual Economic assistance, Vietnam was unable
to tap into Western capital and know-how until its
withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. In addition, as
a result of the U.S.-led embargo and poor central
economic planning at home, Vietnam still has an
annual per-capita income under $400. And even
though the Doi Moi policy has been successful to
date, Vietnam's small but growing middle class
counts on annual incomes of less thiui half the
$2,600 of their upwardly mobile neighbors in China.
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Vietnam remains a poor country with a physi-
cal, legal, and economic infrastructure that is still
undergoing a massive overhaul. Economic reform
was undertaken in reaction to the utter failure of
the command economy to survive without Soviet
assistance, not as part of a master plan for devel-
opment as envisioned by other Asian "tiger"
states. This overhaul was and still is administered
by CPV and any ambition for doing business in
Vietnam must consider that the country will con-
tinue to be a single-party state. Accordingly, regu-
lations, laws, and licenses continue to be issued
and enforced at the discretion of the CPV. which
despite the reform movement, is not altogether
comfortable promoting "market socialism," the
term preferred by the CPV to describe a market
economy administered in the shadow of socialist
ideology. But the reform process does continue to
lurch forward, albeit with numerous stops, starts,
and more than a few steps backwards.
The result is that Vietnam is similar to a foot-
ball field with moving goal posts—the rules
UARKETlNGMAMGEMEflJ
Asia ''s Next Tiger?
always seem to change just when one is about to
be profitable. This phenomenon is explained part-
ly by bureaucracy, partiy by government insecuri-
ties about administering a market economy, and
partly by corruption. Despite the efforts of Prime
Minister Vo Van Kiet to take a personal interest in
.streamlining licensing agreements and business
procedures, generally, the bureaucracy and red
tape in Vietnam remain daunting. So. while
license applications for investment continue to
grow, actual investment by foreign corporations in
approved projects fell over 40% in the first half of
1996. Some foreigners have become especially
wary of joint ventures with Vietnamese firms
(usually state-owned), and the Vietnam News
Agency has reported a trend toward wholly owned
foreign projects.
Besides bureaucratic slowdowns and corrup-
tion, the CPV continues to coddle state-run enter-
prises and Hanoi intends to keep the state sector as
the vanguard of the economy. Investment in infra-
structure and the tledgling private sector remains
relatively small. Virtually all investments to date
have been in oil and gas exploration, fisheries,
cash exports, or other big-ticket items, with state
enterprises serving as the Vietnamese partners.
The private sector grew to more than $300 mil-
lion in combined capital in 1993, with license
applications for private businesses maintaining
double-digit growth since 1993. But local private
manufacturers complain of excessive taxation,
lack of capital and resources, and government
favoritism for foreign investments, especially
joint-venture projects with the state.
Foreigners looking to create partnerships with a
private Vietnamese company must be aware that the
private sector receives lots of praise, but few useful
resources in Vietnam. The state-run commercial
banks, which account for almost 90% of bank assets,
are heavily, if not exclusively, geared toward the
state enterprise sector. Listings on the long-planned
Vietnam Stock Exchange—and the exchange
itself—have not yet appetired. Some 50 state firms
have been ordered to begin "equitization," gradually
selling small .stakes into private hands.
Unfortunately, there is no secondary market for
these equity stakes. Smaller private companies and
foreign joint ventures already prepared for privati-
zation have been discouraged from offering shares,
and management buyouts and outright acquisitions
have been frowned upon as well. By 1996, ,'i,000
of the 12,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) oper-
ating in 1993 were closed or merged as part of Doi
Important Political
Developments Since 1992
• The United States and Vietnam established diplomatic rela-
tions in 1995; Vietnam likely will be granted most favored
nation status as a trade partner. The latest reports out of both
Washington and Hanoi suggest this decision is not likely to be
made before the end of 1997.
^ Vietnam joined ASEAN and is expected to join the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
• Constructive engagement with China, Vietnam's principal
rival in the region, resulted in reduced military threats, exchanges
of senior delegations, and an 80% increase in bilateral trade.
• The Greater Mekong subregion—a trading zone of 200 mil-
lion consumers from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos. Thailand, and
southern China—emerged. The subregion shares the costs and
benefits of regional infrastructure and investment products, *
lowers trade barriers, and facilitates exchanges of goods and
services. Vietnam, at the mouth of the Mekong, serves as the
primary conduit to the entire region.
^ A 50% debt forgiveness negotiation with the Paris Club,
and rescheduling and forgiveness of over $750 million in debt
with the London Club, allowed Vietnam to tap the Eurobond
market for needed capital.
• Joint arrangements with Asian and Westem governments
and banking groups were established to reorganize and to
reform Vietnam's ailing financial-services sector.
Moi, but only five small state enterprises have
"equitized" to perniit private participation.
Medium-size firms also have fell the financial
squeeze due to efforts by CPV conservatives to
keep all assets in the hands of the state. From
1991-1995, Vietnamese state and private partners
were able to attract foreign investors by offering
land rights directly to foreign companies as an
important part of the local partner's contribution
to the capital of a new business venture. Before
the controversial Decree 18/CP in February 1995,
Vietnamese firms also were able to mortgage
land-use rights for loans. And while repeal of this
decree is still being debated in the National
Assembly, for the time being, land use rights must
be leased directly from the state. This places a sig-
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Vietnam: The Bad News
^ Inconsistent and frequently inexplicable policies that hinder
all aspects of the transition from a command to a market econo-
my, including the legal, banking, and accounting systems.
>- Persistent and expanding trade deficits, which ballooned
from $60 million in 1992 to $2.2 billion dollars in 1996.
• Growing overseas debt.
>• Burgeoning current account deficit, which hit an estimated
15.1% ofGDP in 1995.
>• Stagnating foreign direct investment (FDI) realizations; while
approval rates are soaring, actuiil rejjization of the projects is slow-
ing, p;inly because of the frustrations presented by bureaucracy.
V- Inefficiencies of state-owned enterprises, as evidenced by
little job creation and the failure to create value-added exports.
nificant burden on existing companies and new
ventures attracting loans and foreign investments.
Individuals and small firms typically have been
left out of plans for financial-services reform. If
they can buy shiu-es of equitized firms, they cannot
trade them. The 62 foreign banks and bank repre-
sentative offices in Vietnam are severely restricted
in taking Vietnamese dong deposits, especially
from Vietnamese citizens. The dong's present
exchange rate is approximately 11,000 to I U.S.
dollar. The Vietnamese government has develop-
ment plans that require between $40 billion and
$50 billion of investment, yet it can reasonably
expect only half this figure to come from foreign
sources. Government officials must mobilize
domestic savings to fund the needed investments
in infrastructure and key industries if they want to
emulate the Asian tiger economies.
Without banking services from foreign banks,
Vietnamese citizens and small private firms are
left with the state banking system. This system is
set up to serve state enterprises and continues to
have serious service delivery problems, such as
the inability to clear checks between branches of
the same bank. Even for a developing country.
Vietnam has a low volume of noncash transactions
and difficulty with checks jmd wire payments. In
many cases, foreign firms must pay their employ-
ees—and settle payroll tax liabilities^—in cash.
Vietnam has one of the lowest deposit rates in the
developing world, less than 25% of GDP. (Most
countries average 75%, with higher rates in Asia.)
This is not surprising considering that local
banks charge for withdrawals, an obvious disincen-
tive to save in the fonnal banking system. Memo-
ries of high inflation and bank failures also impede
progress. In the 1980s, statc-mn banks failed to
honor withdrawals, infonnal credit cooperatives
collapsed, and high inOaiion discouraged saving.
Altemative services and sources of capital have
filled the vacuum created by state-bank shortcom-
ings. Informal credit rings are flourishing, with
more than $2 billion being hoarded outside the
fonnal banking system in U.S. dollars, gold, or
consumer goods such as liquor and durable goods
that will hold their value over time. Viet Kieu
(overseas Vietnamese) infusions also play a role.
Approximately 2 million Viet Kieu bring money
into the country and/or send money to families and
friends. Some private banks also have been estab-
lished in Vietnam, with many turning a profil from
trade finance. Financial-service reforms, however,
still tend to ignore small enterprises and con-
sumers, and the institutions generally are out of
step with the standards required by serious players
in a global economy.
All of these perils have taken the bloom off Viet-
nam's ro.se. Many investors who came with high
expectations and hopes for quick results quickly
had them dashed and departed Vietnam in search of
the next investment Shangri-La. Michael Scown, a
partner with Russin and Vecchi in Ho Chi Minh
City and a former president of the American Cham-
ber of Commerce in Vietnam, recently shared a
growing sentiment among investors: "It has become
increasingly apparent that investoi-s will have to set
more realistic goals, truly commit to projects and
settle in for the long haul."
Now, the Good News
It would be easy for a marketing manager in
charge of introducing and/or managing a product in
Vietnam to become disheartened by the bad-news
scenario. But for every investor who leaves, two
more seem to fill the vacuum because the market is
so promising. The macroeconomic reftirms that
resulted from Doi Moi. have controlled inflation,
freed prices, promoted agriculture and export mar-
keting, spurred foreign investment, and opened
domestic markets.
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Many of the problems in Vietnam are simply
growing pains, which the central government is
working to remedy. And, after a decade of
reforms, the direction, if not the pace of Doi Mni.
remains focused on economic growth and expan-
sion. Moreover, Vietnamese authorities increas-
ingly are attempting to facilitate the foreign
investment process. "We have shifted toward a
market economy." says Tran Quang Nghiem.
chairman of the Government Price Committee.
"Now, we must modernize. This requires estab-
lishing a modem, integrated marketing, finance,
and accounting system throughout the country and
with links to external markets." To those ends
legal, tax, and financial reforms have been pro-
posed, and many desirable projects have had their
license procedures "fast tracked" by the govern-
ment. The economy continues to grow, inflation
remains low, and some early foreign investors
have begun to generate returns.
Recent political developments also should
make investors optimistic. Vietnam has been at the
heart of a region dominated for centuries by brutal
conflict, but the climate in the last five years has
arguably fostered progress on a sustainable peace
and more-predictable economic growth than any
time in the past 50 years.
Improved relations with the United States and
China have been critical to Vietnam's economic
success. Vietnam faces few extemal constraints on
growth and can continue to reduce military spend-
ing in favor of infrastructure investment. Vietnam
now boasts of trading relationships with over 100
nations. Once contentious with most countries out-
side the fonner Soviet bloc. Le Van Bang and Ha
Huy Thong, Vietnam's ambassador to the United
States and deputy consul, respectively, have on
more than one occasion informed us that Viet-
nam's current foreign policy is to "get along well
with everyone."
Vietnam continues to capitalize on its successful
mix of domestic reforms and openness to foreign
investment. Even though the country started its
reform process nearly a decade after China, the
Vietnamese have been able to catch up in the areas
of agricultural reform, price refonn, currency deval-
uation, and healthy growth rates for GDP and for-
eign investment. Similar to China, the Communist
Party has remained in command, with the role of
guiding the economy along the road to "marketiza-
tion." In this regard, CPV is functioning much more
like the single-party '"capitalist" states in the region
than the Stalinist regimes of the cold war. The
Asian Development Bank and other sources predict
9%-I0% annual growth rates, single-digit inflation
rates, and exponential growth in consumption.
Marketing Environment
The bureaucracy can firustrate the most deter-
mined investors and the CPV does not yet fully
embrace the private sector but. on balance, the
macroeconomic and political changes coupled
with pent-up consumer demand make a com-
pelling argument for investment in Vietnam.
Indeed, precisely because of the current uncertain-
ty of the market, opportunities abound if investors
understand the unique dynamism tbat is Vietnam.
Investors who wait for optimal conditions will
miss the proverbial boat. But where, exactly, are
the opportunities right now?
Infrastructure
Because Vietnam is in the process of rebuilding
a nation, tbere are many opportunities in infrastruc-
ture development. Seaports, airports, highways,
water treatment facilities, buildings, dams, power
stations, and other foundations to support a modem
Vietnam: The Good News
• Annual GDP over the last five years has averaged 8.2%.
> - Inflation has dropped from 487% in 1986 to 12.4% in 1995,
mainly attributable to tough govemment budgets.
> • Agricultural production has risen 1% annually and industrial
production has jumped 13%-I5% annually since 1988.
• Reorientation of trade to a market-style economy doubled
exports between 1992 and 1993.
> - Registered imports are up; unregistered imports smuggled in
from Southem China and Thailand via Cambodia are way up.
> • FDI licensing approvals totaled $18 billion at the end of
1995, up 97% in 1995 alone.
• Overseas direct assistance pledges remain healthy, with $2
billion pledged at the latest donor conference held in November
1995 in Paris.
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EXHIBIT 1
Housebold possessions of durables
Source: 1996 raw data provided by SRG Vietnam
economy are being built or refurbished. Goods and
services that abet the process—construction,
telecommunications, and transportation supplies
and equipment—^are in huge demand, and investors
have acces.s to multilateral aid to fund the projects.
Export Markets
Many govemment policies, including tax breaks
and export processing zones, encourage investors to
initiate operations that facilitate export growth and
development. Imports of heavy equipment, tor
example, often are duty free. Petroleum and miner-
als, aquaculture, and agriculture also are viable
industries. Vietnam is beginning to demonstrate the
ability to produce quality products in low-tech,
labor-intensive, value-added industries such as tex-
tiles and furniture. With a redoubled effort to estab-
lish technology parks and R&D centers, and a com-
milment to maintain low wages, Vietnam hopes to
compete in high-tech industries within a decade.
Consumer Markets
All types and brands of consumer products and
services are rapidly diffusing throughout Vietnam.
Popular brands familiar to Americans are begin-
ning to dominate the clothing, electronics, house-
hold goods, and recreational beverage markets.
Foreign brands are equated with quality and pres-
tige, and consumers are willing to pay price pre-
miums for them. This trend, while generally posi-
tive, also has some drawbacks because even
though brand names are very popular among Viet-
namese, brand authenticity is a secondary consid-
eration. Consequently, one drawback is a booming
brand-piracy industry, whereby the Vietnamese
manufacture or distribute counterfeit items.
Brands associated with pop culture. Disney char-
acters, Ray Ban sunglasses, and Nike are just a
few examples of popular trademarks that are fre-
quently victimized.
A second drawback is concern by the CPV and
domestic manufactunsrs that Vietnamese products
are being squeezed out of the marketplace. Conse-
quently, domestic producers have called on the gov-
emment to protect industries such as cigarettes, bev-
erages, detergents, and paper. The success of foreign
products has been accompanied by a crackdown on
"social evils" such as karaoke bars and many types
of outdoor advertisements. While the government
has not expected demand for popular brands or non-
Vietnamese ideas to disappear, it has taken steps lo
avoid cultural disintegration and complete domi-
nance by foreign products. For example, the govem-
ment stipulates that ads for foreign products include
copy in the Vietnamese language.
Govemment rhetoric, however, cannot affect
the reality that the consumer is now king in Viet-
nam. Truly, there is no stopping or even slowing
this revolution. Rising incomes, exposure to popu-
lar culture, product availability, and limited oppor-
tunities for other forms of recreation arc making
shopping and consumption popular pastimes.
More specifically, trends affecting the shift toward
a consumer culture include live basic factors:
urbanization, family dynamics, emerging middle
and upper classes, a foreign invasion, and the
youth movement.
Urbanization. Vietnam is still an agrarian society
with 80% of the population living in the country-
side, but there is large-scale migration to the cities.
This migration is the result of economic growth
and opportunities afforded by extensive foreign
investment in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City. Danang.
Can Tho, Hue and Haiphong, and special econom-
ic zones such as Vung Tau. As part of this urban-
ization process, Vietnamese are increasingly
exposed to the new consumption ethos found in
the cities.
Family dynamics. Large families continue to
share small houses, with urban households typical-
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ly consisting of more than seven members.
Although each family member earns only a few
hundred dollars each year, household income
more than exceeds expenses. Children live at
home until marriage, contributing to the family
income in addition to their own needs. Viet Kieu
family members also contribute significantly by
sending money or gifts. So, while individual pur-
chasing power is modest, pooled resources by
families create purchasing clout.
Emerging classes. Millions of Vietnamese now
have disposable income. Official figures in Hanoi
and Ho Chi Minh City indicate incomes now often
approach and exceed $1,000, respectively. Our
personal interviews indicate much larger, unre-
ported and untaxed pockets of wealth springing up
throughout Vietnamese cities. A middle and even
a small upper class is emerging. Many consumers
or households now can afford relatively expensive
items such as motorcycles, televisions, VCRs,
stereo equipment, and washing machines; some
can afford luxury items of all kinds, including
automobiles, villas, and high-fashion products (see
Exhibit 1).
Foreign invasion. Many Vietnamese fee! under
seige with all the new products and advertise-
ments. Furthermore, tourists and expatriates visit-
ing or working in Vietnam bring new ideas, prod-
ucts, expectations, and demands. Hotels, trans-
portation services, discos, newspapers, magazines,
golf courses, promotion campaigns, and satellite
TV all are intended to meet the needs of this grow-
ing "foreigner" market. But Vietnamese also are
exposed to these new products, information, ideas,
and values and, subsequently, are changing their
expectations and demands.
Tabula rasa. The combined impressionable nature
of youth and the flood of new ideas and products
has created a segment of Generation X consumers
in a very short period of time. The tabula rasa fac-
tor and the sheer size of the youth market is hav-
ing a profound effect on Vietnamese society.
Although still family-oriented and living under the
shadow of socialist dogma, more than half of Viet-
nam's population is under age 20. To these con-
sumers, the Vietnam War and the teachings of
Uncle Ho are little more than a history lesson.
But then, who has time for history when one
can work for a Westem company; save a little
money; buy the latest CD, a pair of jeans, and
An affluent population
of teenagers in Ho Chi
Minh City now has the
wherewithal to obtain
credit cards from
foreign banks and
purchase expensive
imported consumer
goods.
some fake Ray Ban sunglasses; and then cruise Le
Loi Boulevard and Dhong Khoi Street on a new
Honda Dream motor scooter? Anyone who has
spent an evening trying to cross these streets will
appreciate the accuracy of this description of the
youth market. An
affluent population of
teenagers in Ho Chi
Minh City now has the
wherewithal to obtain
credit cards from for-
eign banks and pur-
chase expensive
imported consumer
goods. In addition to
constituting a growing
market in their own
right, Vietnam's
young are becoming
opinion leaders for
others.
These trends all indicate radical change, rapid
market segmentation, and consumer clout. A
decade ago there was only one segment; the desti-
tute. Just a few years ago segmentation schemes
differentiated consumers on urban-rural and North-
South dimensions. More recently, age, access to
Westem or developed-market Asian ideas and
products, one's marketable skills, and disposable
income have become factors that predict consump-
tion pattems. Although it should be noted that as in
any transforming agrarian economy in which
socialism and collectivism were the norm, there is
a conservative element, particularly in Northern
and rural regions, whose members prefer tradition-
al or local Vietnamese products. Nevertheless, the
sweeping trend is a society transforming to a con-
sumer culture, and in the cities this transformation
is occurring at an astonishing rate.
'Exit' Interviews
Vietnam is a promising market, but to succeed
there, marketing managers must have more than a
fundamental understanding of the classic 4Ps of
the marketing mix. They must accept that Vietnam
is a series of enigmas and seemingly illogical con-
founds. Management in Vietnam is as much art.
nuance, and persuasion as science. We have con-
ducted many exit interviews with investors—liter-
ally, interviews with investors at either Tan Son
Nhat or Noi Bai airports exiting Vietnam because
Wm[f!l997ZZ
EXHIBIT 2
Top five most frequently consumed soft
drinks in Ho Chi Minh City
Source: 1996 raw data provided by SRG Vietnam
of failed projects. For the most part, those projects
did not fail because of poor market demand for the
goods or services, but because managers and
investors simply could not come to grips with the
arcane conditions of Vietnam's management envi-
ronment. The emergent themes from those inter-
views, as well as from the success stories, are fac-
tors U.S. managers need to consider.
Move With the Goal Posts
Managers must accept that the goal posts in
Vietnam will continue to shift, making it difficult
to score. Asian investors and some Europeans
seem much more willing to accept this fact and
spend considerable amounts of time nurturing
relationships with partners and government
authorities. (Note too that these two entities are
sometimes synonymous.) Consequently, they are
able to predict and adjust to goal-post movements.
More importantly, they often discover that
because of their efforts to nurture relationships,
the goal posts haven't moved at all for them.
As a case in point, the country manager for one
European brewery was pleased to inform us that his
fimi would not have to remove or repaint its bill-
boards in response to the social-evils campaign. He
attributed this time and cost savings solely to his
efforts to maintain a good relationship with govem-
ment authorities. American investors, however, find
it difficult to work solely on solid relationships and
trust and want to ensure that all the legal issues are
agreed upon before moving forward. If this strategy
were not .so counterproductive, it would be comical
because the legal codes in Vietnam are either
nonexistent or revised continually.
This is not to argue that one should abandon
respect for laws and the legal process. To the con-
trary, understanding Vietnamese laws and Viet-
nam's legal system is very important. For exam-
ple, favoritism toward Americans and American
brands is a powerful advantage that should not be
underestimated. But Tanya Pullin, an atlomey for
Baker and McKenzie who has practiced in Viet-
nam, adds that "trademarks in Vietnam mean
nothing unless they are registered in Vietnam."
Trademark registration begets government protec-
tion. Despite problems with brand piracy, the gov-
emment will crack down by closing bogus plants
and fining purveyors of pirated goods (/the pirated
trademarks are registered.
Even the fundamcnuil logic of "best product for
the best price" means little in Vietnam. "We went
to the Vietnamese govemment with a proposal for
a new cement formula that was 30% better and
30% cheaper," says James Reany of International
Trade Resources. "We even used Vietnamese lab-
oratories to 'convince' them of our product's
superiority. To make a long story short, there's a
lot of building going on in Vietnam, but we're not
part of it yet." So, investors and managers con-
stantly stmggle to balance home-country laws.
Vietnamese laws, and social forces in addition to
managing the marketing mix.
The moving goal posts make Vietnam an
exceptionally challenging market. But there are
good, recent examples of large and small finns
that have figured out how to score. PepsiCo, typi-
cally second in market share in the cola wars
around the globe, arrived in Vietnam five hours
after the U.S. embargo was lifted. The company
thoroughly researched all relevant aspects of the
market and, in so doing, determined demand and
found an optimal partner and appropriate manu-
facturing sites. PepsiCo kept thc initial investment
low, established quality controls, offered profes-
sional training and cash resources, and effectively
used Su Lua Cuti The He Moi ("The choice of a
new generation") as Pepsi's promotional tag Une.
In one year, this joint venture, in which Pepsi-
Co holds 30% equity, had sales revenues of $33
million and a profit of $2.5 miliion. In two years,
Pepsi outpaced local producer Tribeco to become
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the dominant brand in southern Vietnam (see
Exhibit 2). In the process. PepsiCo solidified its
relationship with the govemment by paying $6
million in taxes and employing 1,200 people.
Procter & Gamble. Colgate-Palmolive, and the
Coca-Cola Co. also are enjoying success. Compa-
nies providing a product or service that consumers
can pay for now are doing well.
Small-firm success stories also are being written
by a number of young, energetic entrepreneurs from
the United States who are targeting newly emerging
niche markets. From bamboo production and real-
estate brokerage to trading companies and language
centers, these pioneers are making a mark in Viet-
nam. They all have some common threads: low
overhead, flexibility, an ability to see opportunities
where others only saw stumbling blocks, target
focus, enthusiasm, and a sense of adventure. And
they all made a total commitment: They moved to
Vietnam, immersed themselves in the environment,
leamed the language, and made discoveries that
enabled them to leverage their skills. Upon reflec-
tion, we concluded that the successful large multi-
nationals exhibited many of these traits as well.
Pick the Right Location
Managing business affairs from outside Viet-
nam generally proves to be an unsuccessful strate-
gy. Precisely where one should locate in Vietnam
depends on the product line, target market and
strategic interests, but a local presence and some
oftlcial support are crucial. Ho Chi Minh City
(formerly Saigon) is the largest, most cosmopoli-
tan urban center and Vietnam's commercial hub.
Given that it has only been part of a socialist econ-
omy since 1975, it also has a population more
familiar with free enterprise. Not surprisingly, it i.s
usually favored by foreign investors. (By the way.
Saigon is still the preferred term among locals, but
marketers would be well-advised to speak of Ho
Chi Minh City when dealing with govemment
authorities.)
There are other locations, however, that should
not be overlooked. The Vietnamese government is
eager to develop the North and the countryside,
and often offers incentives to foreigners interested
in investing in these areas. The Coca-Cola Co.'s
decision to establish a joint venture in the North,
for example, has helped to overcome its compara-
tively slow start in Vietnam and is considered a
factor in Coke's popularity in the northem part of
the country. Moreover, while the urban sprawl of
Ho Chi Minh City may make it an attractive con-
Market research
has been and
always will be
important in
Vietnam.
sumer market, rent and wage increases may make
it less desirable for manufacturing. Consequently,
special development zones such as Haiphong or
Vung Tau. which also happen to be ports, may be
more attractive sites for factories.
Research the Market
Market research has been and always will be
important in Vietnam. But because of proliferating
products/promotions and growing consumer
sophistication, the dynamics of the market—and
the research requirements—have changed consid-
erably during the past three years. For many Viet-
namese, attitudes and beliefs
have changed. Understanding
how they have changed is
instrumental in determining
how to manipulate the market-
ing mix.
Second, the competition
across product categories has
become much more intense.
These changes collectively shape how one might
now administer, for example, a promotions cam-
paign. Unlike the early 1990s, the battle for many
segments now is being fought on differentiation
rather than awareness. Furthermore, where simple
outdoor advertisements and P-O-P materials once
sufficed, many managers will now have to consid-
er the importance of other variables in the market-
ing communications mix.
Several market-research and advertising firms
have established operations in Vietnam, but there
still is no substitute for sending multiskilled
employees there to examine market conditions thor-
oughly and to determine the viability of the product
or service offering as well as the appropriate man-
agement of pricing, distribution, and promotion.
Invest in the Vietnamese People
No matter how great the demand for a product
or service, if the organization to manage it is going
to be larger than a mom and pop operation,
employee selection, training, and management are
critical. Fortunately, the pool size and quality of
applicants for many jobs have increased impres-
sively in the past three years. Younger Vietnamese
are scrambling to learn English, computer skills,
and marketing. Only three years ago, we were
hard-pressed to find anyone who could operate a
computer and speak English well. We found no
one who had both of these skills plus a customer
orientation. By comparison, we have associates
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who recently placed an ad in a Ho Chi Minh City
newspaper for a clerical position that required
some customer con-
tact and received
l.-'iOO applications-
more than 200 of
whom met or exceed-
ed the qualifications.
The Vietnamese
have eamed a reputa-
don for being hard
workers and as a pop-
ulation they enjoy
one of the highest lit-
eracy rates in Asia:
they are also very
keen to leam contemporary business practices and
often prefer to work for American companies. The
work force is still lacking middle managers, how-
ever, and this problem can only be remedied with
substantial investments in corporate-sanctioned
training.
Three More Ps
The initial reforms in Vietnam favored only
well-capitalized or well-connected businesses that
could build roads, export oil, or generate hard cur-
rency. But the country is opening up to marketing
enterprises of all sizes and specialties, Vietnam's
transformation has
created a growing
appetite among Viet-
namese and the
expanding foreign
community for all
kinds of goods and
services. It also has
links to other promis-
ing markets in the
region. For example,
its strategic location in
the Greater Mekong
subregion makes it
possible for firms to
enter Vietnam as part
of a larger plan to market products to the 200 mil-
lion consumers in this emerging trade bloc.
But as promising as the market may be, it is
still perilous. Bureaucratic encumbrances and
Problems especially
relevant to Vietnam
include the absence
of qualified man-
agers, poor infra-
structure, and erratic
improvements in the
legal, tax and
accounting systems.
other constraints one would expect to find in any
developing economy are inevitable. Problems
especially relevant to Vietnam include the absence
of qualified managers, poor infrastructure, and
erratic improvements in the legal, tax and account-
ing systems. Rent extractions and other forms of
corruption by national and local authorities also
are problematic; so too are occasional reactionary
movements within the govemment as Vietnam
makes its transition to a market economy. And
now competition has become a factor, as many
companies struggle to penetrate the market and
establish brand dominance.
Any serious marketing manager in Vietnam
should add "prudence," "patience," and "persis-
tence" to the classic 4Ps
of the marketing mix. In
Vietnam, relationships
take time to nurture and
can be expensive to main-
tain. Favorable brand and
company images must be
built and cared for. Good
contacts, understanding
tbe market, incremental
growth, and sound busi-
ness practices that
address the unique Viet-
namese condition will
pay off in the long term.
Although the Vietnamese government's poli-
cies can be confusing, the government has
attempted to address problems that need longer-
term solutions. Even with 10% growth rates, how-
ever, it will be at least a decade before Vietnam
joins the ranks of the dger economies. But mar-
keters would be well-advised to seize the day.
Vietnam wili eventually join them, and companies
that enter the market now will gain an early
foothold as significant players in Vietnam and the
region as a whole. •
Editor's Note: In April 1996. CUjfShultz
chaired a conference on "Markets and Marketing
Opportunities in Vietnam." Cosponsored by the
American Marketini^ Association, Arizona State
University West, and the World Trade Center, it
brought high-ranking Vietnamese govemment and
business officials together with their American
counterparts to address the current marketing
environment in Vietnam.
Good contacts,
understanding the
market, incremental
growth, and sound
business practices
that address the
unique Vietnamese
condition will pay
off in the long term.
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